Publications: Competition and Antitrust Law

There have always been close links between collective dominant market positions (Article L.420-2 of the French Commercial Code / Article 82 of the TEC[1]) and concerted practices (Article L.420-1 of the French Commercial Code / Article 81 of the TEC). Indeed, the existence of structural links between companies (notably in the form of concluded agreements) on the one hand, and the adoption of a common line of conduct on the market on the other hand, may establish the existence of a collective dominant market position[2]. Yet, these two structural and behavioral requirements must be cumulatively met:...

On December 16, 2009, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority or hereinafter “Autorité”) published new guidelines on merger control (“Guidelines”) replacing and superseding the previous ones enacted by the French General Directorate for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control in 2004 and amended in 2007. These lengthy Guidelines (165 pages) aim at clarifying and simplifying the rules and analysis method applied by the Autorité to control all merger operations notified since January 1, 2010. :
This...

A parent company owning (directly or indirectly) 100% of its subsidiary’s capital is presumed to exercise a “decisive influence” on such subsidiary. This makes the parent company directly liable for any infringement of competition rules by its subsidiary because both entities are considered as a “single economic entity” pursuant to competition and antitrust law[1]. :
A judgment rendered in September 2009[2] by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the “Court”) further consolidated the strength of this presumption since the Court held...

In a landmark decision dated March 17, 2009, the Cour de cassation (French Supreme Court) upheld the position adopted by the Paris Court of Appeals in a judgment dated April 8, 2008 that reversed a ruling of the Conseil de la concurrence [1](the French competition authority which is now known as the Autorité de la concurrence) that imposed a EUR 10 million fine on GlaxoSmithKline laboratory (”Glaxo”). The Conseil de la concurrence held that this laboratory ought to be sanctioned for having hindered the entry of generic drugs in hospitals through a predatory policy -that...

  While exchanges of information are less detrimental to competition and less damageable for the economy than price cartels and allocations of market shares, they can be considered as anticompetitive practices even if the exchanged information does not underpin another prohibited practice and does not directly concern prices. :
This is the final position adopted by the Paris Court of Appeals in a judgment dated March 11, 2009 that put an end to the legal saga of “mobile phone operators” that started in 2005: the three operators were fined (41 million Euros for Orange,...

Leniency programme under French law: conditions and procedure (May 2009)

Practical guidelines for designing and implementing a successful compliance program (March 2009)

Article 95 of the law 2008-776 dated august 4, 2008 known as the law for the modernization of the economy (the “lme”) established a new competition authority called autorité de la concurrence (the “competition authority”). ordinance 2008-1161 of november 13, 2008 (the “ordinance”) implemented the creation of this competition authority which is vested with expanded powers and resources to control anti-competitive practices. Pursuant to the provisions of the LME, the Competition Authority takes over the Minister of the Economy’s task...